November 16, 2026 08:27

Follow Lima Blog on

Fighting money laundering and terrorism financing in crypto-assets: European regulations, policy challenges, and the role of technology 

Joana Neto, AML/CFT data Specialist, European Banking Authority (EBA), France 

 

Click here to download

Introduction 

Innovative technologies with disruptive qualities, like crypto-assets and their inherent business models, can significantly influence the integrity and stability of markets. This is particularly conspicuous in cases where they are used for illicit objectives such as money laundering and terrorist financing (ML/TF). Therefore, striking a balance between their strengths and vulnerabilities assumes pivotal significance. 

There have been a series of events since the creation of Bitcoin that have contributed to the development of policies related to crypto-assets worldwide, particularly with a focus on anti-money laundering or countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT). The first formal international reactions began around 2014 with the “Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Report on Virtual Assets” which—for the first time—establishes a conceptual framework for understanding and addressing AML/CFT risks associated with virtual assets. Even before that, as early as 2013, the European Banking Authority (EBA) issued a consumer alert regarding the use of virtual assets. However, exact regulatory actions were only observed after 2017, following an increase in the popularity of crypto-assets. 

It is then that, in 2018, new international standards were adopted by the FATF, with the amendment introduced by Recommendation 15 and its interpretative note that establishes the application of FATF Standards to all virtual asset activities and related service providers. Embracing international influence, at the European level, in 2018, a significant regulatory achievement was realized within the European Union (EU) involving the inclusion of two specific types of crypto-asset service providers (“CASPs”), under the scope of the so-called “obliged entities,” in the amendments made to Directive (EU) 2015/849[1], concerning the prevention of the use of the financial system for money laundering or terrorist financing purposes (referred to as the “AMLD,” an abbreviation of Anti-Money Laundering Directive). 

Later, the European Commission presented a proposal for a Regulation regarding crypto-asset markets, part of the extensive “Digital Finance” package published in September 2020. This package aimed to establish a European approach that encourages technological advancement and ensures both financial stability and consumer protection. The final Regulation was recently published—as “Regulation (EU) 2023/1114[2] concerning crypto-asset markets” (commonly known as “MiCAR” referring to the abbreviation of Markets in Crypto-Assets Regulation)—and now governs crypto-asset markets that were previously outside the scope of EU financial regulation. 

This represents a significant milestone, as the newly introduced standards define the foundations of another legislative product at the European level: the package targeting AML/CFT, with considerable emphasis on crypto-assets, particularly within the Regulation (EU) 2023/1113[3] on information accompanying transfers of funds and certain crypto-assets (commonly known as “FTR”). 

From a technological perspective, the new regulatory frameworks represent many opportunities and challenges to CASPs and related services and products. This article describes and explores how crypto-assets have evolved in the EU regulatory perimeter over the years. Based on that, it also describes some of the practical challenges those regulations have introduced and the subsisting spaces for improvements for innovative solutions, namely: a) traceability and discoverability, b) interoperability and messaging protocols, c) data privacy, anonymity enhancing technologies and privacy-enhancing technologies, and d) transacting with self-hosted wallets. 

Crypto and crime 

Crypto-assets, with their decentralized and pseudonymous nature, can be exploited for various criminal activities, including ML/TF, fraud, and cybercrime. Their potential to facilitate anonymous transactions and evade traditional monitoring systems has led to heightened concerns about their misuse. Indeed, across the years, the crypto-assets landscape has been marked by significant events that have both concerned the public and regulators alike. For example, the 2017 WannaCry ransomware attack was one of the first substantial scandals which demonstrated the use of cryptocurrency, particularly Bitcoin, for ransom payments in a large-scale global cyberattack, shedding light on the vulnerabilities of outdated computer systems. Another example is the 2019 Quadriga CX scandal which exposed the risks associated with those exchanges, as the sudden passing of the exchange’s CEO left millions in cryptocurrency inaccessible due to a lack of access to cold wallet keys. Also, numerous tax evasion schemes involving crypto-assets have emerged, taking advantage of the relative anonymity and decentralization of digital currencies to underreport income and evade taxes, prompting governments and tax authorities to intensify efforts to regulate and enforce tax compliance within the crypto space. 

These events underscore the complex and multifaceted nature of the cryptocurrency ecosystem. Consequently, several regulatory and supervisory bodies have recognized the evolving landscape of digital financial technologies and its implications for global AML/CFT efforts. For example, the European Banking Authority (EBA), has emphasized[4] the importance of addressing the AML/CFT risks associated with crypto-assets in several products including the need for robust regulatory frameworks to counter the potential misuse of crypto-assets for criminal purposes. The EUROPOL has actively monitored and analyzed the link between crypto-assets and criminal activities and, in its annual Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment (IOCTA), EUROPOL describes[5] the role of crypto-assets in cybercrime, ransomware attacks, and dark web marketplaces. As a result, international bodies emphasize the need for collaborative efforts between supervisors, law enforcement agencies, and the private sector to combat crypto-enabled crimes effectively. 

The illicit uses can be varied, ranging from ransomware attacks, and hacking incidents, to data breaches, and frauds, amongst many others. Concerning ransomware attacks, criminal actors often demand ransom payments in crypto-assets due to their pseudonymous and decentralized nature, making it challenging to trace transactions and identify perpetrators. Crypto-assets also play a pivotal role in dark web marketplaces where illegal goods and services are bought and sold. These platforms enable anonymity for both buyers and sellers, making tracking and prosecuting criminal activities more complex.  

More generally, criminals can exploit crypto-assets for ML/TF purposes due to their potential to obfuscate the origin of assets which combined with its global nature makes it attractive for ML/TF networks to move illicit proceeds. Also, crypto-assets have been associated with various types of fraudulent schemes, including investment scams, Ponzi schemes, and initial coin offering (ICO) frauds. Fraudsters use the allure of high returns and innovative technologies to lure victims into these schemes. 

Evolution of crypto-asset policies in Europe: past, present and future 

      1. Directive (EU) 2015/849 (AMLD) 

    The currently applicable legislation is Directive (EU) 2015/849 (“AMLD”), concerning the prevention of the use of the financial system for AML/CFT purposes. The “AMLD”, through its amendments in 2018, introduced a series of updates to the EU’s AML/CFT legal framework. Particularly in the realm of crypto-assets, this Directive included, for the first time at the European level, certain crypto-assets services within the scope of the AML/CFT legal framework, designating them as obliged entities. However, only two types are covered by the current Directive. According to Article 2 (1, (g) and (h)), these are (I) providers whose activity involves the exchange of virtual currencies and fiat currencies and (II) providers of wallet custody services. 

    The rules adopted by the aforementioned Directive represent a significant step within the EU, yet obstacles persisted. Firstly, the current AMLD is a Directive of minimum harmonization. This implies that Member States can go beyond the established minimum standard when transposing it into national law. The legal requirements applicable to obliged entities and the approaches of competent authorities for AML/CFT supervision can thus vary depending on each country’s risk-based approach. 

    Secondly, the EU rules are not only transposed and applied inconsistently but also are not entirely aligned with the latest international standards, which have evolved since the last amendment to the AMLD. This is because they do not encompass a comprehensive range of CASPs that should adhere to AML/CFT requirements, and they are not tailored to the risks posed by this wave of innovation. The vast majority of CASPs are not covered by the AMLD and, consequently, are not regarded as Financial Institutions, thus falling outside the regulatory and supervisory framework of the EU. 

    As a result, the divergent approaches to regulating and supervising providers of these services have had a significant impact on the crypto-asset market. Given these barriers and the fact that crypto-assets are increasingly used for money laundering and other illicit purposes, the need for legislative changes that align EU laws with FATF standards has become urgent. 

        1. Regulation (EU) 2023/1114 (MiCAR) 

      In this context, the European Commission announced the “MiCAR”, as part of the extensive Digital Finance package from September 2020, published in the Official Journal of the EU on June 6, 2023. This marked the initial step towards completing and updating the EU’s legal framework in this domain, which establishes requirements for CASPs seeking authorization to operate within the single market. This Regulation provides a legal framework for crypto-assets and CASPs, including a definition and a list of recognized services that incorporate the FATF’s recommendations into EU legislation. The Regulation also encompasses provisions regarding licensing and registration requirements, supervision rules, maintaining financial stability, and safeguarding investor protection. 

      The three subcategories of crypto-assets—crypto-assets (Article 3(1)(5)), asset-referenced crypto tokens (Article 3(1)(6)), and electronic money crypto tokens (Article 3(1)(7))—are subject to distinct requirements tailored to the varying risks associated with each. The MiCAR will apply from 30 December 2024, except for Titles III and IV, which will apply from 30 June 2024. 

          1. The package of proposals by the European Commission 

        The “MiCAR” serves as the foundation for another legislative process that draws inspiration from this Regulation to expand the AML/CFT role to a broader range of crypto-assets. Indeed, the analysis of crypto-assets in the new real of the regulatory perimeter is incomplete without reference to the package of four legislative proposals for AML/CFT, published by the European Commission on July 20, 2021: a) proposal for a Regulation on combating ML/FT (“AMLR”), b) proposal for a 6th Directive to combat ML/FT (“AMLD6”); c) proposal for a Regulation creating a new EU Anti-ML/FT Authority (“AMLA”); and d) proposal recast of the Fund Transfer Regulation (“TFR”). Once all the legislative products are implemented, they will reshape the legal and institutional framework of the EU in both the AML/CFT domain and the realm of crypto-assets. One of the most significant measures is the inclusion of a broader range of CASPs among the entities subject to AML/CFT rules.  

        In this context, on one hand, the Proposal for a Regulation on combating ML/FT (“AMLR”) will establish, for instance, that providers of these services are prohibited from maintaining anonymous crypto-asset portfolios. It will also ensure that the AML/CFT requirements will be extended to CASPs. On the other hand, the proposal for a 6th Directive to combat ML/FT (“AMLD62), considering the specific vulnerabilities in ML/FT, will allow national competent authorities to exercise their supervisory powers over CASPs as well. Furthermore, it will also broaden the possibility for Member States to require CASPs established on their territory with a head office in another Member State to appoint a central contact point (as is currently already the case for electronic money issuers and payment service providers). This encompassed also the introduction in the proposal recast of the “TFR” of a traceability requirement for crypto-asset transfers[6], which will complement the recent Digital Finance Package from September 2020 and ensure full consistency between the EU framework and FATF standards. 

        Excepting the “FTR”, all the other pieces of legislation are still being discussed amongst the legislator and co-legislators.  

            1. Regulation (EU) 2023/1113 (FTR) 

          The “FTR” first came into effect in June 2015, following FATF Recommendation 16 on electronic funds transfers and the so-called travel rule, which outlines what financial institutions must do to enable authorities to trace fund transfers when necessary to prevent, detect, or investigate illicit activity. In this context, the Regulation mandates that financial institutions ensure that information about the originator and the beneficiary is transmitted throughout the entire payment chain. Since the adoption of 2015’s “FTR,” FATF has extended the application of Recommendation 16 to virtual asset service providers, as the transfer of virtual assets poses similar AML/CFT risks as fund transfers. However, the “FTR” itself was not amended at that time, which meant that crypto-asset transfers remained outside its scope and, consequently, anonymous. 

          With this proposal to revamp the “FTR,” the European Commission aimed to extend the scope of the Regulation to encompass crypto-asset transfers, aligning it with FATF standards. This implies that CASPs will be required to include sender and recipient information in crypto-asset transfers, similar to how payment service providers already do for electronic transfers. This is done to identify individuals engaging in the transfer of crypto-assets for AML/CFT purposes, including potentially suspicious transactions, and to block such transactions if deemed necessary. 

          This extension of the existing rules governing fund transfers to crypto-asset transfers is not only in alignment with the EU’s legal framework and FATF standards but is also crucial for addressing both existing and emerging AML/CFT risks associated with the use of crypto-assets. 

          The Regulation (EU) 2023/1113 of the European Parliament and of the Council, dated May 31, 2023, concerning the information accompanying fund transfers and certain crypto-assets, and amending Directive (EU) 2015/849 (recast), was recently published in the Official Journal of the EU on June 9, 2023. It shall apply from 30 December 2024. 

          The practical challenges of crypto-assets and the role of technology 

          The newly introduced regulatory frameworks also create some technological challenges with respect to the tools available to address the underlying requirements. In this section, four main challenges related to the application of AML/CFT systems and controls to crypto-assets will be analyzed. These relate mostly with application of Regulation (EU) 2023/1113. 

          Discoverability 

          Discoverability, although not an official concept embed in legislative texts, is a crucial concept in the practical world. In crypto-assets can be referred to, for the purpose of this paper, as the ease with which information about a particular crypto-asset, token, or blockchain project can be found and accessed by any interested parties. It encompasses factors such as the availability and visibility of information. 

          Discoverability is often related to the real-time identification of counterparties and it is important as there are different requirements depending if the transfer is intended to be sent to a hosted wallet or self-hosted wallet. Although solutions exist in the market, mainly to look-up CASPs identifiers or addresses, it is often not easy to fulfil this requirement. In addition, because of the different levels of application of the FATF standards across the globe (issue known as “sunrise issue”) and the lack of a global CASP identifier register, it might happen that there is not easy availability of (credible) information or even comprehensive data with regards to certain entities. This might be the case with respect to entities not yet subjected to authorization/licensing regimes or where the counterparties don’t have in place solutions to address the FATF’s travel rule requirements. Innovation is still evolving in this area and would be welcome with regards to mechanisms to address these challenges. 

          Interoperability and messaging protocols 

          Several protocols exist already to address the emergent requirements of transfer of crypto-assets. CASPs can mostly find available in the market open protocols (i.e., any CASP can use them to send accompanying information), closed-networks protocols (i.e., the protocol decides which CASPs can use them based on certain criteria), and protocol-agnostic solutions (i.e., end-to-end solutions). However, several open and closed-networks protocols are not interoperable between each other. As consequence, CASPs are either forced to integrate with multiple protocols to be able to transact with any counterparty or are not able to engage in transactions with counterparties that adopted different protocols offering different standards. This can be resource intensive and cause delays in the roll out of the implementation of the travel rule requirements while the CASP struggle to identify which protocol to adopt. In addition, when CASPs decide to integrate different protocols, because of the different standards they entail, CASPs might be faced which data integration issues and other derived challenges. The goal should therefore be, as much as possible, to foster openness and collaboration, reachability, ease of integration and standardization. 

          Therefore, it is important that protocols evolve in a way that enhance interoperation amongst them and do not restrict its use to a restrict group of CASPs. In this context, the use of blockchain-agnostic solutions could be considered if other protocols—either open or close network protocols—cannot ensure that their channel mechanisms are sufficiently robust to enable other CASPS to comply with the transmission of information requirements or cannot ensure comprehensive transaction coverage. This aims to reduce discoverability and reachability friction and boost the improvement of interoperable solutions and technological advancements. There is, however, space for improvements in the industry in terms of interoperability and integration of crypto-assets messaging systems to tackle the mentioned issues. 

          Data privacy, anonymity enhancing technologies and privacy-enhancing technologies 

          Privacy-enhancing technologies (PETs) and anonymity-enhancing technologies (AETs) are both designed to protect individuals’ online privacy, but they serve different purposes and provide different levels of privacy protection. They are often used interchangeably but, for the purpose of this paper they are defined as two different concepts. PETs are a broad category of technologies and practices aimed at safeguarding individuals’ personal information and data. They focus on minimizing data collection, limiting data sharing, and ensuring that data is used only for its intended purpose while preserving the functionality of the service or system. They are, therefore, useful for the purpose of addressing data protection requirements and the challenges with data sharing. AETs, on the other hand, are a subset of PETs that specifically focus on concealing or obfuscating a user’s identity online. These technologies aim to provide a high degree of anonymity, often by dissociating online activities from an individual’s real-world identity. They might be, for instance, used to obfuscate the origin of funds or the true originator. 

          The use of PETs particularly is yet to be widely explored by CASPs—or even other credit and financial institutions—and the associated products and service providers, although in a landscape characterized by pseudonymity and transparency PETs emerge as vital tools. They bolster privacy by concealing transaction details, such as originator, beneficiary, and amount, safeguarding sensitive personally identifiable information, without impacting information sharing requirements. By enhancing privacy (not anonymity), PETs support the security of the crypto-asset transfers, making it difficult for malicious entities to target users or exploit vulnerabilities. Moreover, these technologies strike a balance between privacy and regulatory compliance, allowing privacy while still collecting essential transaction data. PETs broaden crypto-assets’ applications, catering to businesses and individuals seeking to shield financial data without circumventing regulatory obligations. 

          Transacting with self-hosted wallets 

          When drafting Regulation (EU) 2023/1113, regulators were concerned about the potential for self-hosted wallets to be used for ML/TF, and an eventual split over effect after the newly introduced requirements on CASPs. Unlike transactions on centralized platforms, which are now subject to AML/CFT regulations, transactions involving self-hosted wallets can be more challenging to trace and monitor as the anonymity associated with self-hosted wallets can hinder law enforcement efforts and make it easier for criminals to engage in illegal activities. It also makes it difficult for supervisors to ensure compliance with the new regulations. Therefore, self-hosted wallets are one of the most substantial policies introduced by Regulation (EU) 2023/1113. Several articles put those in the spotlight by requiring CASPs to a) obtain and hold the information on the self-hosted wallet, b) ensure that the transfer of crypto-assets can be individually identified, and c) assess whether that address is owned or controlled by the CASP customer where transfer amount exceeds EUR 1 000. 

          These raise challenges in the enforcement of customer due diligence rules, namely on the identification and verification, of self-hosted crypto wallets (where required). To date, the industry is not yet substantially equipped with solutions that allow to determine with 100% reliability a) the involvement from or to a CASP (excepting in certain situations), b) who owns or controls a self-hosted when that is not own or controlled by the CASP’s customer. 

          Conclusion 

          The relationship between crypto-assets and crime is multifaceted, with the potential for both innovation and illicit activities. Indeed, the emergence of disruptive technologies and the growing utilization of crypto-assets have highlighted the need for comprehensive efforts to address associated risks, such as ML/TF. Therefore, regulators and supervisors scaled up their tasks to safeguard the integrity, efficiency and proper functioning of the financial sector, assessing how existing regulatory structures address these risks, and what challenges we face that require the adaptation of Regulations to meet new needs. Equally, the evolution of regulations surrounding crypto-assets and their implications for AML/CFT has marked a significant stride towards aligning the European Union’s legal framework with international standards. The “MiCAR” and the recast of the “FTR” exemplify the EU’s commitment to adapting its regulatory landscape to the evolving financial and digital landscape. 

          At the same time, the new regulatory products introduced a need for more technological innovation to tackle the requirements of the legislators. Many solutions have been introduced in the market since the updates to the FATF standards. However, the evolving technology landscape creates hurdles for tracing and identifying crypto-assets. This calls for continuous adaptation and technological innovation among the industry, service providers, regulators, supervisors and law enforcement. Areas like discoverability, interoperability and messaging protocols, data privacy, anonymity-enhancing technologies and privacy-enhancing technologies, or yet self-hosted wallets could still benefit from creative solutions to emerge in the market. 

          Any views expressed are solely those of the author and so cannot be taken to represent those of the EBA or to state EBA policy. Neither the EBA nor any person acting on its behalf may be held responsible for the use that may be made of the information contained in this publication, or for any errors that, despite careful preparation and checking, may appear.

           

          [1] Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Directive 2006/70/EC (Text with EEA relevance), OJ L 141, 5.6.2015, p. 73–117, available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32015L0849.

          [2] Regulation (EU) 2023/1114 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2023 on markets in crypto-assets, and amending Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) No 1095/2010 and Directives 2013/36/EU and (EU) 2019/1937 (Text with EEA relevance), PE/54/2022/REV/1, OJ L 150, 9.6.2023, p. 40–205, available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32023R1114&qid=1686298471708.

          [3] Regulation (EU) 2023/1113 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 May 2023 on information accompanying transfers of funds and certain crypto-assets and amending Directive (EU) 2015/849 (Text with EEA relevance), PE/53/2022/REV/1, OJ L 150, 9.6.2023, available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32023R1113&qid=1686298255242.

          [4] See, for instance, EBA (2019), Report with advice for the European Commission on crypto-assets, EBA, Paris, available at https://www.eba.europa.eu/eba-reports-on-crypto-assets.

          [5] See, for instance, Europol (2023), IOCTA, internet organised crime threat assessment 2023, Europol, available at https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2813/587536.

          [6] See section below on “Regulation (EU) 2023/1113 (FTR)”.

          Leave a Reply

          Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

          Facebook
          Twitter
          LinkedIn
          WhatsApp
          Email

          Related Posts

          Sign up for our Newsletter